One of the major philosophical concerns of feminist theorist Eva Kittay is    justice for   dependents and their caretakers. She proposes an argument for justice and social cooperation to ground policies of dependency care, which are conceived as critical to a just and equal society.          

Kittay begins her project with a critique of Rawls’ theory of social cooperation, as    it relates to justice and the moral person.  Justice, as conceived by the liberal tradition Rawls’    exemplifies, should provide principles that fairly distribute the benefits   and   burdens of social    cooperation    among free    and    equal persons     (100).    For Rawls, this is only achievable among    people who possess certain moral capacities:  a sense of justice and a conception of their own    good    (100).  He    argues that all primary goods are derived from    these two moral    capacities and that these    primary goods serve as criteria for making assessments about our interpersonal well-­‐being    (100).   In other words, social cooperation is contingent on rational moral actors who   can conceive of and act in accordance with notions of justice.  

  It is also important to qualify that most of what Rawls considers a primary good is self-directed: freedom of thought, liberty of conscience, freedom of movement, etc (101).   Our concept of what is  ”good” originates in an individual desire to not be unnecessarily hindered by external forces.  

  Kittay argues that this understanding of social cooperation and justice is insufficient because it denies the reality of human dependency and neglects to demonstrate a commitment to care.  People are not infallible, atomized individuals. They exist in interpersonal networks of vulnerability and care. For Kittay,  a crucial component  of  justice  is  the  ability  to  care and be taken care of, without losing your personal autonomy or sacrificing your well-­being (102). She states that:     

“We can possess basic liberties, freedom of movement and choice  of  occupation,   the powers  and  prerogatives  of  public  office, even income and wealth,   without the assurance that we will  be cared  for  if  we  become dependent; that   when we are called upon to do the work of caring for  a  dependent,  we will be adequately supported in our undertaking; and that, as we  focus  our  energies an  attention on another, we  do  not thereby  lose  the  ability to care  for   ourselves”      (102).” 

The recognition of vulnerability inherent  in dependency relationships  – all relationships really – leads Kittay to  add  a  third  moral  power  to  Rawls  original list: a capacity  to respond to vulnerability with care (102). Therefore, the ability to conceive of and act in accordance with notions of justice is not enough.  A moral actor must also recognize human vulnerability and infuse their overriding concept justice  with  a  strong  commitment  to  care.     

  I find Kittay’s reformulation of the concept of justice enticing.  Like Kittay, believe    that “we are diminished  [when] we live in a society in which care can be had only through such sacrifice.” (103).  Life is marked by inequalities – inequalities of temperament, of capacities, of physical capabilities ­- but people’s lives should  not be unfairly  determined by the  inevitability of vulnerability (i.e. people should not  have to sacrifice themselves in order to care take or be taken care of).  However, I find  Kittay’s model insufficient  when  applied to  the  economic  and  gender  inequality  inherent in dependency   work.  Dependency work is poorly paid and largely gender  determined  (110).  Kittay states that “fair equality of opportunity would mean that a woman who chooses dependency work as paid labour, even if the work is poorly paid, makes her choice unconstrained by gender discrimination  (111).”      

The  ramifications of this statement are two-fold.  Firstly, it describes dependency work as a function of economic  status.  Dependency work is not just a gendered choice, but also an economic  one. Dependency work is poorly paid, and depends on  source of cheap labour.  Cheap labour depends on people in less than favourable  economic  circumstances.  Therefore,  Kittay concludes, the choice   to  engage in dependency work is always coercive.